DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 452 277 TM 032 565

AUTHOR Birmingham, Carrie
TITLE The Virtue of Reflection.
PUB DATE 2001-04-00
NOTE 31p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Seattle, WA, April 10-14, 2001).
PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070) -- Opinion Papers (120) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Educational Theories; *Ethics; *Reflective Teaching; Teaching Methods; *Values
IDENTIFIERS Reflection Process; Reflective Thinking; *Virtues

ABSTRACT

Most theoretical work on reflection in teaching has been analytical. This body of work presents reflection not as a unified concept but as a loosely aligned group of perspectives. These distinct but related perspectives on reflection in teaching have taken on identities and paths of their own. The existence of this body of research implies that there is an idea of reflection in teaching that can be distinguished from other ideas about teaching. This paper explores the common rubric that holds this body of research together. It proposes that the similarities among the different conceptualizations of reflection are not merely surface similarities but rather reflections of a cohesive phenomenon that can be identified and described. The identification of this phenomenon has the potential to extend the body of research to a greater depth for educators and students. It is generally recognized that pedagogical reflection is closely related to moral and ethical constructs, while reflection itself has generally been characterized as morally neutral. This paper constructs a line of reasoning that provides a rationale for the identification of pedagogical reflection as a virtue in the classic sense and its specific identification as the virtue "phronesis," or practical wisdom. The commonalities between pedagogical reflection and virtue are traced. Implications for teacher education and development are discussed. The moral virtue of pedagogical reflection is necessary to promote excellence in teaching, learning, and human flourishing. (Contains 42 references.) (SLD)

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made
from the original document.

The Virtue of Reflection

by

Carrie Birmingham

AERA-2001

Seattle, Washington

Carrie Birmingham, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Division of Humanities and Teacher Education
Pepperdine University
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263

(310) 317-7405
carrie.birmingham@pepperdine.edu

ED 452 277

TM032565

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
C. Birmingham
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

THE VIRTUE OF REFLECTION

In many ways, the conceptualization of reflection in teaching has expanded and developed since the 1970's, when it became a popular construct in teaching and teacher education. In other ways, much of the early theoretical work has remained solid and salient as a foundation of more current research. Dewey's How We Think (1933) and Schön's works on the reflective practitioner (1983, 1987) continue to serve as defining groundwork for many teacher education programs, as well as Van Manen's (1977) distinction between three levels of reflection—the technical, the practical, and the critical.

Most theoretical work on reflection has been analytical—taking apart, drawing distinctions, focusing on certain aspects, creating perspectives, and exposing underlying differences. This body of work presents reflection not as a unified concept, but as a loosely aligned group of perspectives. Building on early foundations, these distinct but related perspectives on reflection in teaching have taken on identities and paths of their own. Zeichner (1994), for instance, groups these perspectives into five historically based traditions: the academic tradition, the social-efficacy tradition, the developmentalist tradition, the social-reconstructivist tradition, and the generic tradition. Research typically focuses on one perspective and explores it as it relates to other theories, examines it in the lives of teachers, and applies it to programs in teacher education and development.

Although the dominance of this analytical way of thinking about reflection in teaching implies that reflection in teaching is whatever a (reflective) person makes of it, the very existence of this body of research implies that there is an idea of reflection in teaching that can be distinguished from other ideas about teaching, say, teacher decision making, teacher beliefs, or teacher knowledge. There must be *something* that makes reflection in teaching what it is and not

something else. There must be *something* that holds this body of research together under a common rubric. In this paper, I propose that the similarities among the different conceptualizations of reflection are not merely surface similarities, but that the distinct perspectives of reflection are exactly that—perspectives of a cohesive phenomenon that can be identified and described. Further, the identification of this phenomenon has the potential to extend the body of research on pedagogical reflection to greater depths of service for educators and students.

The vast majority of work on pedagogical reflection either argues for or is based on the assumption that reflection is somehow good for us—good for teachers and good for students. "It is usually impressed on novice teachers by their professors that good teachers are reflective teachers" (Van Manen, 1991, p. 99). While this may appear obvious, it is not trivial, for it lies at the heart of pedagogical reflection. When we say that pedagogical reflection is good, we have made a judgment about its educational value. Note, however, that education itself promotes human good. As such, it falls squarely within the scope of morality. Assuming, therefore, that pedagogical reflection has educational value, it too occupies part of the moral terrain.

Many researchers have already linked moral and ethical elements to pedagogical reflection. One of the most prominent examples is van Manen's (1977) highest level of reflection—critical reflection—which addresses the politico-ethical "question of the worth of knowledge and...the nature of the social conditions necessary for raising the question of worthwhileness" (p. 227). Although Hatton and Smith (1995) found that preservice teachers rarely reflected on this highest level, they nevertheless concluded that "critical dimensions [of reflection] need to be fostered from the beginning, for teaching is a moral business concerned with means *and* ends" (p. 46). Paradoxically, Liston and Zeichner (1987) found that teacher education programs which

encourage preservice teachers to examine education critically actually promote moral inculcation instead of true moral deliberation. These researchers advocate a program of explicit and open-ended moral deliberation that emphasizes "choice between sufficiently articulated and reasonably distince moral positions" (p. 3). Indeed, deliberation on moral dilemmas in teaching from a variety of ethical frameworks comprise the content of reflection in some cases (Valli,1990; Regan, Case, and Brubacher, 2000).

Other studies have drawn connections between reflection and moral dispositions, both those that promote and those that impede reflection. Perhaps the most well known is Dewey's (1933) descriptions of the attitudes of openmindedness, responsibility, and wholeheartedness, which he claims are essential for the development of reflection. On the other hand, Cole (1997) examines the constructs of anxiety, fear, helplessness, loneliness, meaninglessness, and hostility (based on Jersild, 1955) as impediments to reflection. Valli (1997) contrasts reflective teachers with unreflective teachers, who "have not developed the intellectual and moral capacities to make wise decisions or to consider the consequences of their actions" (p. 70).

While it is generally recognized that pedagogical reflection is closely related to moral and ethical constructs, reflection itself is usually characterized as either a mental process, a cycle involving thinking and acting, or a capacity for engaging in this process or cycle. Moral issues may comprise the content of reflection, and moral dispositions may support the process of reflection, but reflection itself is characterized as morally neutral. Yet if reflection is considered to be essentially non-moral, acquiring its value in a wholly instrumental way, the possibility that reflection could produce immoral ends becomes a live option. While it is true that educational institutions and processes might be used to promote immoral ends, it is highly unintuitive to conceive of pedagogical reflection, in its full sense, promoting immoral ends. For example, we

would be strongly inclined to say that educators who carefully consider the most effective strategies to produce racial bias in their students are *not* being reflective, for, in so doing, they are not considering the full implications of their actions and are not displaying the dispositions of openmindedness and responsibility that accompany the disposition of reflection. We would agree with Aristotle (trans. 1985), who argued that moral deliberation should actually promote moral life:

> The many, however, do not do these [virtuous] actions but take refuge in arguments, thinking that they are doing philosophy, and that this is the way to become excellent people. In this they are like a sick person who listens attentively to the doctor, but acts on none of his instructions. Such a course of treatment will not improve the state of his body; any more than will the many's way of doing philosophy improve the state of their souls (p. 40).

Unless pedagogical reflection is explicitly characterized as intrinsically moral, however, the prospect of an immoral form of pedagogical reflection logically follows. While it is doubtful that the hidden possibility of reflection being embedded in immoral contexts will actually promote such a phenomenon in classrooms and teacher education programs, it is hoped that a clearer explication of the particular moral significance of pedagogical reflection will shed light on the moral import of day to day thinking and acting in the lives of teachers.

Of course, education is saturated with moral issues, perspectives, arguments, and systems. Where does this specific moral issue of pedagogical reflection fit into the field of ethics? How can ethics inform the concept of pedagogical reflection? I believe that the system of ethics that can best elucidate this notion is the aretaic, or virtue-centered ethics. The goal of this paper is to construct a line of reasoning that provides a rationale for the identification of pedagogical

reflection as a virtue in the classical sense and, furthermore, its more specific identification as the virtue *phronesis*, or practical wisdom.

Reflection and Virtue

A second obvious but non-trivial commonality among the various perspectives of reflection in teaching is that reflection requires an agent. In all cases, reflection involves a person who is reflecting. The particular nature and content of reflection is influenced or constructed by the community and the situation, but the reflecting resides within the person-reflecting. The word *reflect* itself calls to mind the physical phenomenon of viewing oneself in a mirror, emphasizing the personal quality of self-examination that is involved in reflection. Virtue, in like manner, resides within a person. Zagzebski (1996) defines virtue as "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person" (p. 137). The heart of a virtue-centered ethical system is the individual and his or her character. This is in contrast to utilitarian or deontological moral systems that are focused on rules or actions that are external to the individual. Thus, the source of both reflection and virtue is the person-reflecting, the moral agent, the reflective educator.

Virtue-centered ethics holds that moral value is based on character rather than actions. Actions, to be sure, are related to virtue, but they are secondary to and derived from virtue as a natural outgrowth of virtuous character. When actions are absent, virtue is unexpressed. As a virtue, then, reflection is an aspect of personal character, and it is expressed in actions such as self-evaluation, serious consideration of students' perspectives, and careful examination of teaching goals.

In a book published fifteen years after his influential paper, van Manen (1991) calls this capacity for virtuous, thoughtful action *pedagogical tact*, which is a general term for a moral way of being with children, closely related to the virtue of pedagogical reflection. (In this work, van

Manen uses the term *reflection* to denote the kind of thinking that guides pedagogical tact.) "To exercise tact means to *see* a situation calling for sensitivity, to *understand* the meaning of what is seen, to *sense the significance* of this situation, and to actually *do* something right" (p. 146). This seeing, understanding, and sensing are the actions that naturally flow from the pedagogical tact. The seeing, understanding, sensing, and doing are not pedagogical tact itself, but if none of these actions ever occurs, one could say that the virtue of pedagogical tact is not present. Pedagogically tactful action is an expression of the virtue of pedagogical tact and reflection.

In *Theory of the Moral Life* (Dewey, 1932), Dewey develops an ethical system he calls *reflective morality*, in which he argues that actions and character are inextricably intertwined. Every action, even a seemingly trivial action, is potentially of moral import because it is connected to other actions. Actions bond together to form conduct; thus, no action stands alone. Conduct, in turn, leaves an "enduring impress" (p. 13) on the character of the actor. More important than an action itself is the lasting impression it leaves on character, for actions bound together into conduct are what form the habits of character. Furthermore, habit is not simply a tendency to repeat certain actions. In fact, habit

> reaches even more significantly down into the very structure of the self; it signifies a building up and solidifying of certain desires; an increased sensitiveness and responsiveness to certain stimuli, a confirmed or an impaired capacity to attend to and think about certain things. Habit covers in other words the very make-up of desire, intent, choice, and disposition which gives an act its voluntary quality. (p. 13)

In turn, the habitual nature of character leads to

> the permanence of the personal disposition which is the real cause of the outer acts and of their resemblance to one another. Acts are not linked up together to form conduct in and of

themselves, but because of their common relation to an enduring and single condition—the self or character as the abiding unity in which different acts leave their lasting traces. (pp. 13, 14)

Thus, conduct both builds character and is defined by character. Actions, which comprise conduct, become habits or dispositions, which comprise character. Habits in turn are expressed in actions. Thus, "conduct and character are strictly correlative" (p. 15).

This cycle of reflective morality is properly driven by reflective thought on what is good and how to achieve it, for "there can be no such thing as reflective morality where there is not solicitude for the ends to which action is directed" (p. 30). Reflective thought, according to Dewey, is "active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends" (Dewey, 1933, p. 9). Thus, reflective thought guides an individual into virtue, and virtue is expressed in virtuous action. The virtue of pedagogical reflection is not an action itself; the virtue of pedagogical reflection leads to actions, and actions in turn lead to the establishment of moral character, including the virtue of reflection.

Just as reflection involves actions, reflection involves thinking and knowing as well. Reflective thinking is necessary for reflection, but it is not sufficient. An educator who thinks reflectively but does not act reflectively would not be considered reflective. For example, teachers who reflectively consider strategies to promote equity and justice in their classrooms, come to value equity and justice in the classroom, but do not work to promote equity and justice would be somehow lacking in their quality of reflection. Korthagen (1985) characterizes reflection as a cycle of thinking and acting which includes action, looking back on the action, awareness of essential aspects, creating alternative methods of actions, and trial, which is the

start of a new cycle. Schön (1983, 1987) builds a model of reflection in which knowing and thinking are inextricably bound up in action, coining the terms *reflection-in-action* and *reflection-on-action*. Even Dewey, whose conception of reflection is often depicted as a systematic process of thinking (Hatton and Smith, 1995; Valli, 1997), indicates reflective actions and dispositions as essential qualities characterizing the reflective person.

Since thinking and knowing are central aspects of reflection, many researchers have focused on the thinking and knowing of educators, analyzing and extending these concepts in an attempt to describe the cognitive processes involved in reflection. Indeed, as Cole (1997) points out, the study of teacher reflection originated in the field of teacher thinking. Some researchers (Zeichner and Liston, 1985; Hatton and Smith, 1995; Sparks and Langer, 1991) analyze the content of reflective thinking using a type of hierarchy that is similar to van Manen's (1977) categories of technical rationality, practical reflection, and critical reflection. Others explore the developmental processes of growth toward reflective thinking (Kitchener and King, 1981; Ross, 1989; Valli, 1997). Korthagen (1993) extended the model of systematic, rational, language-based decision-making in reflective thinking to include non-rational, gestalt-type thinking as an important and prevalent way that reflective teachers think. Although research on reflective thinking comprises a large part of the research on reflection, its importance should not imply that thinking and knowing are the whole of reflection or even the heart of reflection. Often the term *reflection* is used to describe the mental action of thinking reflectively. However, I would argue that reflection, in this sense, differs from possessing the quality of pedagogical reflection.

All but the most technical conceptions of reflection (see Cruickshank & Applegate, 1981) hold that the application of theory, rules, principles, skills, and procedures does not comprise reflective practice. Particular teaching contexts are much too complex and specific to confine

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

reflection to the application of principles and regulations. In fact, the limitations of principles and regulations are just what makes pedagogical reflection important. Rather than constraining a specific situation as an objective instance of an abstract principle, reflection considers the concrete intricacies of the characters and histories of the persons involved. Each case is considered as a special case. Of course, a reflective teacher learns from past experiences and comes into a situation with expectations and anticipations, but not with a rigid mental rule book. "What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules—not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable—but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for" (Noddings, 1984, p. 13).

Although principles are not equivalent to reflection, principles are related to reflection. For instance, principles such as "Respect students" and "Be fair" can be derived from pedagogical reflection. In addition, principles can be used to teach, define, or point the way to a disposition, as a parent imposes a rule on a child in the hope that over time the child will internalize the rule and develop the disposition, or as a socially awkward adolescent studies a book on the art of conversation in hopes of becoming more affable. Even Cruickshank's (1985) strategies for developing reflection, which have been criticized for being oriented toward technical and narrow questions of teaching (Gore, 1987), can be characterized as an early scaffolding, "a basis for providing tools which will enable other forms of reflection to develop" (Hatton and Smith, 1995, p. 35).

Moral principles are important in a morally dilemmatic situation, or in a conflict that must be resolved by a third party. As in Habermas's (1990) discourse ethics, principles of justice are important when the values of different groups conflict. In educational institutions, principles of justice may ensure fairness in situations of conflict, especially when the moral habit of fairness is

not being expressed by one or more participants in the conflict. Virtue is still important, though, because a commitment to a core of moral dispositions makes such a moral conflict approachable, helping participants to identify personal bias and make sound judgments (Zeichner and Liston, 1987; Jordan & Meara, 1990). Such a commitment to the moral habit of pedagogical reflection enables educators to examine and evaluate conflicting beliefs "in light of the grounds that support [them] and the further conclusions to which [they] tend" (Dewey, 1933, p. 9), so that difficult moral problems can be analyzed and resolved more clearly than would be the case if the participants' thinking were habitually rigid or careless.

One of the criticisms commonly leveled at virtue-centered ethics is that it is a system that is too vague, too subject to interpretation, not easily enough pinned down, and thus not useful in resolving complicated moral dilemmas or identifying appropriate moral actions and solutions. (Pojman, 1990). Indeed, the primacy of virtues may appear to preclude the moral deliberation needed to analyze the varying perspectives and argue for the logical conclusions to a morally complex situation. Someone may ask, "What should I do?" to which a virtue-centered ethicist would reply, "Do what a virtuous person would do." The questioner responds, "Who is the virtuous person?" which is answered, "The person who does what is right." This impreciseness can be seen as both a strength and a limitation of the virtue-centered system. Pedagogical reflection, similarly, is not easily pinned down. In fact, educators have spent more than two decades trying to describe it at all. Reflection is not an action, a thought process, a set of rules or principles, or anything that can be institutionalized or formatted into a checklist. In the accountability-oriented culture of the schools, reflective practice "has garnered little institutional support as a legitimate form of professional development, possibly because it is more difficult to control" (Cole, 1997, p. 17). Pedagogical reflection, then, as a virtue, is embodied in the

reflective educator. A student teacher may ask, "What is the reflective thing to do?" to which a pedagogically reflective teacher educator would reply, "Do what a reflective teacher would do." The student teacher responds, "Who is the reflective teacher?" which is answered, "The teacher who practices reflectively." As unsatisfying as this dialog may be to some searching for a precise mapping out of the domain of pedagogical reflection (not to mention the student teacher looking for a quick answer), it is nevertheless expressive of the obscure nature that is shared by virtue and by pedagogical reflection and supportive of the characterization of pedagogical reflection as a virtue.

The argument has been made that pedagogical reflection is best characterized as a virtue because of the striking commonalities between the two: both are an essentially moral way of being, centered in the person, not in actions, thoughts, or principles. The next section will describe the particular virtue, *phronesis*, and demonstrate how its place and function in Aristotle's ethics enlightens the concept of pedagogical reflection as a virtue.

Reflection and *Phronesis*

Aristotle presents *phronesis* as the keystone of all virtues. It is a virtue of the mind, a component of the rational part of the soul. MacIntyre (1966) explains, *phronesis* "is the virtue of practical intelligence, of knowing how to apply general principles in particular situations.... It is the ability to act so that principle will take a concrete form" (p. 74). Furthermore, *phronesis* is a virtue of thought concerning "right reasoning about what is to be done" (Aquinas, trans. 1966, p. 73), or "practice informed by ethical and critical knowledge" (Hursh, 1988, p. 6). In the following section, I contend that the virtue of pedagogical reflection can be identified as the classical virtue of *phronesis* in an educational context. The identification of pedagogical reflection with *phronesis* can be supported by two qualities shared by both: each holds a key

position in its relationship with other virtues, and each is distinct from other virtues of the mind or mental states.

The unity of actions, motivations, and dispositions is basic to virtue-centered ethics. Moral goodness is not about adhering to a list of rules but, rather, about a holistic way of being. Aristotle (trans. 1985), for instance, commented on such diverse areas as politics, education, nutrition, and friendship—all under the category of virtuous living—exemplifying the comprehensive nature of virtue-centered ethics. In Aristotle's description of the particular virtues, *phronesis* functions as a unifying concept. As a keystone virtue, the presence of *phronesis* is both necessary and sufficient for a person to be considered fully virtuous: "as soon as he has intelligence [*phronesis*], which is a single state, he has all the virtues as well" (p. 171). In other words, *phronesis* both requires and encompasses other virtues of character. "Without [*phronesis*] one cannot be virtuous. A man may have excellent principles, but not act on them. Or he may perform just or courageous actions, but not be just or courageous, having acted through fear of punishment, say. In each case he lacks [*phronesis*]...the virtue which is manifested in acting so that one's adherence to other virtues is exemplified in one's actions" (MacIntyre, 1966, p. 74).

This relationship of *phronesis* to complete virtuous living enlightens the unity of pedagogical reflection with other attitudes, actions, desires, conduct, and character into a single way of being. For just as *phronesis* is necessary for complete virtue, virtues of character such as bravery and generosity are necessary for *phronesis*. Although *phronesis* ensures correct reasoning about particular actions, complete virtue, including moral virtues of character, ensures that the ends to which those actions are directed are themselves good. For instance, the reflection of a cowardly person will be distorted by his cowardice, and the reflection of an avaricious person will be

influenced by his greed. Conversely, a person with fully developed moral dispositions, including bravery and generosity, will not entertain reasoning about cowardly, greedy, or other immoral ends. In other words, a person's goals are morally good only if the agent is virtuous, "for vice corrupts the origin" (Aristotle, trans. 1985, p. 155). Thus, the characterization we get of the virtuous person is of one whose moral character embodies both correct values and correct reasoning, accompanied by appropriate actions. In the philosophical writings of Aristotle, *phronesis* is the "eye of the soul" (p. 169) on which the quality of a person's character depends.

This unity can also be seen in Dewey's writing on reflection, where actions, attitudes, habits, and thinking are inseparably intertwined. For instance, in How We Think (1933), Dewey discusses the rational processes and phases involved in reflective thinking. He also devotes attention to three attitudes which he calls "essential constituents of the general readiness" (p. 34) for reflective thinking: openmindedness, wholeheartedness, and responsibility. The first attitude, openmindedness, is described as "freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and such other habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas" (p. 30). Dewey lists three hindrances to openmindedness: mental sluggishness, self-conceit, and unconscious fears. Second, wholeheartedness is a genuine interest in the subject of thought which "buoys [the] mind up and gives an onward impetus to thinking" (p. 32). "Sincerity is another name for the same quality, for it signifies that devotion to an object is unmixed and undiluted... Wholeheartedness is something quite different from immediate enthusiasm and ardor... For it requires consistency, continuity, and community of purpose and effort" (Dewey, 1932, p. 113, 114). Third, "to be intellectually *responsible* is to consider the consequences of a projected step; it means to be willing to adopt these consequences when they follow reasonably

from any position already taken. Intellectual responsibility secures integrity; that is to say, consistence and harmony in belief" (1933, p. 32).

Dewey focuses on the dispositions of openmindedness, wholeheartedness, and responsibility as important in developing the habit of reflection, but he recognizes that other moral dispositions are important as well, "traits of character, attitudes that, in the proper sense of the word, are moral, since they are traits of personal character that have to be cultivated" (p. 34). These moral attitudes are essential for the habit of reflection. These personal attitudes are so important to the development of reflection that Dewey declares,

> If we were compelled to make a choice between these personal attitudes and knowledge about the principles of logical reasoning together with some degree of technical skill in manipulating special logical processes, we should decide for the former. Fortunately no such choice has to be made, because there is no opposition between personal attitudes and logical processes. We only need to bear in mind that, with respect to the aims of education, no separation can be made between impersonal, abstract principles of logic and moral qualities of character. What is needed is to weave them into unity. (p. 34)

Contemporary researchers have specified additional related affective and cognitive qualities to be important in reflection, further indicating the unity of thought process and attitudes in reflective practice. LaBoskey (1989) worked with a group of preservice teachers who exemplified qualities consistent with pedagogical reflection. Besides possessing the general qualities of wholeheartedness, openmindedness, and responsibility, she found that her "Alert Novices" were self-confident, had a "passionate creed" which they sought to follow in their teaching, and tended to ask "why" questions as well as "what" and "how" questions. Korthagen (1985, 1990) found that a sense of personal safety is important for preservice teachers to learn to

take responsibility, and that doubt is a starting point for teachers to begin to inquire into educational theory for help. Pedagogical reflection is also enhanced by a depth of content knowledge and a breadth of understanding of what is happening in the classroom (Houston & Clift, 1990). In her examination of impediments to reflective teaching, Cole (1997) identifies how anxiety, fear, helplessness, loneliness, meaninglessness, and hostility are constructed in the culture of schools. In the language of virtue-centered ethics, these constructs may be identified as vices, or at least as attitudes that are not consistent with virtues. Just as a vice-filled person does not possess *phronesis*, teachers who have developed or have been pulled into these negative dispositions are prevented from being fully pedagogically reflective.

Pedagogical reflection is a way of teaching and being that indicates a unity of thought, attitudes, and actions, enabling a teacher to think and act morally and determining how moral dispositions are to be expressed in concrete action. Just as *phronesis* is essential to virtuous living and virtue is essential for *phronesis*, pedagogical reflection is inextricably bound together with other moral dispositions. This precludes the possibility of pedagogical reflection toward immoral ends, then, since a fully reflective person would necessarily possess the virtues of character which would ensure that reflective thinking and acting are toward virtuous goals.

Zagzebski's (1996) examination of the theoretical importance of *phronesis* in a virtue-centered theory of ethics enlightens the nature of the relationship between pedagogical reflection and other virtues. She asserts that one function of *phronesis* is to determine the mean in cases where the mean is the virtue between extremes. For instance, *phronesis* is needed to tell how much evidence is enough to support a belief. If a person believes a claim on too little evidence or requires an excessive amount of evidence before believing a claim, then this person is at the extremes of deficiency or excess when it

comes to the virtue of intellectual carefulness. The practical wisdom of *phronesis* is necessary to find the mean of intellectual carefulness in a variety of contexts, in which the mean will vary depending on the particulars of the situation. Likewise, pedagogical reflection is needed to determine the virtuous mean in educational contexts, for instance, in regard to the personal qualities described and determined by Dewey (1933) to be essential for reflective thought—wholeheartedness, openmindedness, and responsibility. These three qualities can be conceived of as moral virtues which are means between extremes, and *phronesis* is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to find the virtuous means of wholeheartedness, openmindedness, and responsibility in the context of particular situations.

Wholeheartedness is a genuine, consistent, continuous, sincere devotion to an idea or interest. If a person is deficient in this quality, we would say this person is apathetic. Certainly teachers face the risk of becoming apathetic when they perceive insurmountable obstacles to success as teachers, or when constraints diminish teaching into a tedious, monotonous, and exhausting technical activity. If a person possesses an excess of wholeheartedness, we would say this person is obsessed. More intense teachers experience difficulty letting go of classroom related problems, for instance, the personal needs of students or concerns about the effectiveness of their teaching. Too much of this constant preoccupation can push a teacher's life out of balance. Pedagogical reflection enables a teacher to find the mean and walk the narrow line of wholeheartedness, avoiding falling into apathy and, at the same time, maintain a mentally healthy and realistic perspective on teaching.

Dewey describes openmindedness as a freedom from intellectual impediments, such as prejudice, that make a person unwilling to consider new problems and ideas. If a person is excessively openminded, we would say this person is impulsive. The impulsive person is too open to possibilities, too ready to advocate change, too distracted by novelty. An impulsive teacher unreflectively embraces new strategies, materials, and ideas simply because they are new. If a person is deficient in openmindedness, we would say this person is closed-minded or routine-bound. A routine-bound person unquestioningly maintains the status quo, suspicious of anything new simply because it is new, "guided primarily by tradition, external authority, and circumstance" (Zeichner and Liston, 1987). The routine-bound teacher may teach the same material in the same ways year after year despite cultural shifts and his/her students' changing needs, resisting the possibility that new ideas may be warranted. Indeed, Dewey writes that the value of reflective thought is that "it emancipates us from merely impulsive and merely routine activity. Put in positive terms, [reflective] thinking enables us to direct our activities with foresight and to plan according to ends-in-view, or purposes of which we are aware. It enables us to act in deliberate and intentional fashion to attain future objects or to come into command of what is now distant and lacking.... It converts action that is merely appetitive, blind, and impulsive into intelligent action." (Dewey, 1933, p. 17). In other words, reflective thought enables a teacher to find the mean of openmindedness and avoid the extremes of impulsiveness and routine-boundedness.

Dewey describes intellectual responsibility as the quality that secures integrity. A person who is responsible considers and adopts reasonable consequences of beliefs or actions. Irresponsibility would be the deficiency. An irresponsible teacher may, for

example, treat students inconsistently, use forms of discipline that produce unfortunate long-term effects, or choose instructional strategies that undermine students' development. The excess would be a form of perfectionism that may impair confidence or produce self-satisfied conceit. Pedagogical reflection is needed for a teacher to understand the consequences of beliefs and follow through with appropriate actions without becoming paralyzed by fear of making a mistake or preoccupied with insignificant details.

According to Zagzebski (1996), the second function of *phronesis* is to mediate between conflicting virtues. For instance, a particular situation may have some features that call for fairness and others that call for generosity, yet the fair thing to do would not be generous, and the generous thing to do would not be fair. *Phronesis* is necessary to decide which virtue, in this case, is more important to enact. Suppose a teacher has a policy of informing a student's parent when the student misbehaves a certain number of times or in a particularly egregious way. She has followed through on this policy a number of times throughout the school year. However, she believes that the parent of one of her students is, in her opinion, too harsh with the student when notified of misbehavior. Should the teacher notify this parent of another series of misbehaviors? Is the virtue of fairness regarding the enforcement of the rules or the virtue of caring for the well-being of the student more important in this case? The virtue of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, is the means of determining which of these virtues is more important, considering these particular individuals, these particular relationships, and these particular events.

The third function of *phronesis* is to "coordinate various virtues into a single line of action or line of thought leading up to an act, in the first case, or a belief, in the second" (p. 224). To paraphrase Zagzebski (p. 224), on a typical day, a teacher may encounter propositions about such

matters as the consequences of various school budget initiatives, the guilt or innocence of an accused playground bully, the trustworthiness of particular administrators, the value of phonics in reading instruction, and the weather forecast. To be honest, there may be no conclusive evidence for most positions on these matters. Many human activities, teaching and learning foremost among them, "can be neither fully described nor evaluated in terms of the following of a set of known procedures or rules.... Persons with practical wisdom [*phronesis*] learn how and when to trust certain feelings, and they develop habits of attitude and feeling that enable them to reliably make good judgments without being aware of following a procedure" (pp. 225-226).

Although *phronesis* is considered by Aristotle to be a virtue of the mind, it is not simply a general mental state or form of knowledge. Aristotle draws this distinction by contrasting *phronesis* with other mental states. The first is the virtue *episteme*, or scientific knowledge, which is about things that are necessarily and universally true. In contemporary work, episteme is considered to be a form of expert knowledge of propositions which are claimed to be true, scientifically provable or at least consistent with a given theory, formulated in abstract terms, fixed, timeless, and objective, fully cognitive, unaffected by emotions or desires, and transmittable from one person to another (Kessels and Korthagen, 1996). Episteme is the form of knowledge taken by educational theory, from which teacher educators strive to build a bridge to practice. Kessels and Korthagen (1996) point out that the gap between theory and practice indicates a weakness in the model of episteme as the knowledge base for teaching.

Second, Aristotle distinguishes *phronesis* from *techne*, or craft knowledge, as well. Techne is "a state involving true reason concerned with production" (Aristotle, p. 153). In teaching, techne is the condition of possessing knowledge about the means to reach a given end, for example, how to increase students' test scores or how to keep a well-organized classroom. Techne does not deal

with the nature of the goal, just with the most effective means to reach the goal. In fact, Aristotle does not even consider techne to be a virtue, because "there is virtue [or vice in the use] of craft [techne]" (p. 155). In other words, techne can be used to promote moral or immoral ends, so it has no intrinsic moral value. It is similar to van Manen's (1977) first level of reflectivity, technical rationality, which he identifies with empirical-analytic science. "Empirical-analytic science develops theoretic knowledge such as a behavioral theory of learning that is, for purposes of practical action, technically exploitable. In other words, if theory can explain and predict learning to take place under controlled and controllable conditions, then this theory can be put to practical use *in making students learn*" (p. 225). However, "this instrumental-practical preoccupation of curriculum prevents more consequential questions from being asked: the question of determining what is, in fact, most worth the students' while, with respect both to purposes and experiences provided by the curriculum. Empirical-analytic science cannot deal with the issue of worthwhileness of educational objectives or with the quality of educational experience" (p. 209).

Phronesis, again, is "a state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being" (Aristotle, p. 154). In contrast to episteme and techne, "Intelligence [*phronesis*] ...is about human concerns, about what is open to deliberation...no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise [which is the domain of episteme] or about what lacks a goal that is a good achievable in action [which is the domain of techne]. Nor is intelligence [*phronesis*] about universals only. It must also come to know particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is about particulars" (p. 158). Kessels and Korthagen (1996) explain that *phronesis* in an educational context has to do with "the understanding of specific concrete cases and

complex or ambiguous situations" (p. 19). Similarly, pedagogical reflection is situated in the particulars of a specific time and place and is concerned with specific events, settings, and persons. Educational theory can inform pedagogical reflection, but pedagogical reflection is not simply the application of educational theory. Real educational situations are much too complex, ambiguous, and unpredictable to comply with an algorithmic application of educational theory. The knowledge and thinking that reflection calls for is concerned foremost with the particulars of the situation. This focus is indicated by the terms coined by Schön (1992) to describe the reflective process: *knowing-in-action*, *reflection-in-action*, and *conversation with the situation*.

I have asserted that pedagogical reflection is a virtue in its essence, and I have further identified it as the particular virtue *phronesis*. I have supported this assertion by indicating commonalities between pedagogical reflection and virtue, and between pedagogical reflection and *phronesis*, in particular. It may be argued, however, that commonality does not necessarily indicate equivalence. However, the qualities identified as common between virtue and pedagogical reflection are essential qualities, not incidental qualities. Pedagogical reflection is a virtue because both reflection and virtue are essentially a moral way of being, centered in the individual. Pedagogical reflection is correctly identified as *phronesis* because both sit as the keystone of character, being both essentially necessary and sufficient for complete virtue, and both are distinguishable from other mental states.

Implications for Teacher Education and Development

Education is full of moral values. Issues of responsibilities, rights, care, and justice pervade education from the big picture of systematic structures and policy-making to the

daily realities of classroom interactions. It is no new revelation to claim that teacher education is a moral endeavor. However, the identification of pedagogical reflection as a moral virtue adds another moral and very personal dimension to teacher education. Pedagogical reflection is a personal quality of character that is rooted in an individual, not in an institution. Although institutional policies can either support or hinder the development of reflection in student teachers, in the context of virtue-centered ethics, the quality of pedagogical reflection depends on the personal character of student teachers, which, in turn, calls for certain qualities in the personal characters of teacher educators. A moral evaluation of the quality of pedagogical reflection does not lie in the kinds of students served, the particular programs that have been enacted, or the socio-political stances that have been taken, but the moral states of individual educators. The identification of pedagogical reflection as a moral virtue has the potential to broaden the moral vision of teacher education to include not only the moral value of policies and actions but the moral value of personal character as well.

Although moral virtue comprises a good portion of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the work is not focused on ethics but on "the practical science of human happiness in which we study what happiness is, what activities it consists in, and how to become happy" (MacIntyre, 1966, p. 57). According to Aristotle, a virtuous life is necessary for a happy life. Living a happy and virtuous life depends a great deal on the community in which one lives. In fact, the work traditionally entitled Nicomachean Ethics is declared by Aristotle to be about politics, a description of the political and social structures that (in the context of the Greek city-state) are important for human beings to live happy and virtuous lives. Just as ancient Greek politics is important for developing classical virtue,

the educational community is essential for the development of pedagogical reflection (Cinnamond & Zimphir, 1990). Teacher education programs and school cultures can promote pedagogical reflection in student teachers in many well-documented ways, such as requiring student teachers to keep reflective journals, participate in reflective collaboration, and create mental models of beliefs about teaching (Posner, 2000; Taggart & Wilson, 1998).

Aristotle proposed that the way to become virtuous is to observe a virtuous person and imitate virtuous ways of being. In the context of teacher education, Ross and Hannay (1986) question, "If university instructors, while overtly advocating reflective inquiry, model passive and expository instructional techniques, then how can change be facilitated" (p. 12)? Teacher educators, then, must practice what they preach and model pedagogical reflection in a way that is evident to student teachers. In turn, teacher educators need the university community to support their own pedagogical reflection by providing the freedom, security, time, and space for teacher educators to take risks and ask important questions.

In order for beginning teachers to continue development of pedagogical reflection, school cultures must be supportive of this as well. Unfortunately, Cole (1997) finds school working conditions and cultures to be just the opposite. "Listening to teachers talk about their work we hear frustration, anger, stress, despair, and weariness—states of mind prepared more for survival than deep thinking and learning" (p. 21). She calls for researchers of teaching to collaborate with teachers and become advocates for institutional change that will promote rather than prohibit pedagogical reflection.

Three important questions are suggested by the identification of pedagogical reflection as a moral virtue: Is the non-reflective teacher a bad teacher? Is the non-reflective teacher an immoral person? Is there such a thing as a non-reflective teacher in the first place? It is possible for a non-reflective teacher to be an effective teacher in many ways. There are numerous curricular and administrative supports available to teachers that provide guidelines and materials to effectively and non-reflectively enact particular strategies that are considered to be good teaching. In fact, some administrative and public interests would rather a teacher non-reflectively follow established procedures than rock the boat with reflective inquiry, regarding such a teacher as a better and more effective teacher than the reflective teacher. Others would consider reflection to be a personal and professional asset to any teacher.

Although, given a certain perspective, it is possible to be an effective non-reflective teacher or an ineffective reflective teacher, I contend that the virtue of pedagogical reflection is necessary for a teacher to be a good teacher in a broader moral sense. For the morally good teacher is not one who considers only the most effective means to reach given goals, but one who habitually considers and acts upon the worth of the goals as well.

The contemporary connotation of the phrase "immorality in teaching" usually creates an image of a depraved pedophile. It would seem extreme and unnecessarily judgmental to claim that the non-reflective teacher is immoral. Nonetheless, claiming that pedagogical reflection is a moral virtue implies that a teacher who lacks the quality of pedagogical reflection is somehow morally lacking as well. However, lacking a certain virtue in the context of virtue-centered ethics is not the same as committing a specific

immoral act in the context of consequentialist ethics. For instance, not perfectly possessing the virtue of generosity is not the same as embezzling. Most people, even those who value generosity, are not perfectly generous, but they are not embezzlers, either. Most teachers who are non-reflective are not guilty of daily explicit crimes against children, so we would not claim that they are generally immoral in the consequentialist sense. The word aretaic comes from the Greek *arete*, which means *excellence*. To possess a virtue means to possess an excellence, and aretaic ethics encourages individuals to strive toward moral excellence. Thus, a non-reflective teacher is not specifically immoral, but imperfect or not fully developed. Further research is needed to investigate the developmental processes and contexts involved in developing the excellence of pedagogical reflection.

The use of the description *non-reflective* in this paper is for the purpose of examining pedagogical reflection through the illustration of a non-example. Although this strategy helps to delineate the boundaries of what is pedagogical reflection and what is not, it regrettably may construct an image of a black and white dichotomy between the reflective and the non-reflective teacher. In practice, individuals cannot be unambiguously and clearly grouped into these two categories. Educators are more reflective in certain situations than they are in others; educators are more reflective about certain contents than they are about others; educators may be more reflective on some days than they are on others; some educators are more reflective than others in general. Pedagogical reflection may be seen as existing on a multi-dimensional continuum of time, space, content, culture, and contexts. A teacher may display reflective actions and thoughts to a greater or lesser degree in different parts of the continuum, but the

distinction lies in the habits of the teacher. A teacher who is in the habit of being pedagogically reflective possesses the virtue of pedagogical reflection, even though he or she may not engage in pedagogically reflective actions at times. Likewise, a teacher who is not in the habit of being pedagogically reflective does not possess the virtue of pedagogical reflection, even though he or she may, from time to time, engage in pedagogically reflective actions. There is no absolute measure of pedagogical reflection, and thus, no way to pin down individuals on one place on the continuum. Absolute pedagogical reflection and absolute non-reflection exist as ideas, but actual teachers are somewhere on the continuum between completely possessing the moral habit of pedagogical reflection and completely missing it. Pedagogical reflection, then, serves best not as a rule for judgment of a particular individual but as an abstract excellence toward which all teachers can strive.

There are many moral dimensions of education. The moral complexities of life, especially in the context of teaching, require reflection concerning what is good and how it can be promoted to achieve moral excellence. Pedagogical reflection will not resolve moral dilemmas or answer moral questions. Neither is it a cure-all for the unacceptable situations that follow from immoral or incompetent decisions. However, the moral virtue of pedagogical reflection is necessary to promote excellence in teaching, learning, and human flourishing. Pedagogical reflection is both essentially moral and morally essential.

References

Aquinas, T. (trans. 1966). Treatise on the virtues (J. A. Oesterle, Trans.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Aristotle (trans. 1985). Nichomachean ethics (T. Irwin, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Cinnamond J. H., & Zimphir, N. L. (1990). In R. T. Clift, W. R. Houston, & M. C. Pugach (Eds.), Encouraging reflective practice in education (pp. 57-72). New York: Teachers College Press.

Cole, A. L. (1997) Impediments to reflective practice: Toward a new agenda for research on teaching. Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 3 (1), 7-27.

Cruickshank, D. R., & Applegate, J. H. (1981). Reflective teaching as a strategy for teacher growth. Educational Leadership, 38 (7), 553-554.

Cruickshank, D. R. (1985). Uses and benefits of reflective teaching. Phi Delta Kappan, 66 (10), 704-706.

Dewey, J. (1932). Theory of the moral life. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process. Chicago: Henry Regnery.

Gore, J. M. (1987). Reflecting on reflective teaching. Journal of Teacher Education, 38 (2), 33-39.

Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action (C. Lenhart and S. W. Nicholsen, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Hatton, N., & Smith, D. (1995). Reflection in teacher education: Towards definition and implementation. Teaching and Teacher Education, 11 (1), 33-49.

Houston, W. R. & Clift, R. T. (1990). The potential for research contributions to reflective practice. In R. T. Clift, W. R. Houston, & M. C. Pugach (Eds.), Encouraging reflective practice in education (pp. 208-224). New York: Teachers College Press.

Hursh, D. (1988, April). Progress and problems in becoming reflective: An ethnographic study of pre-service elementary teachers. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans.

Jersild, A. T. (1955). When teachers face themselves. New York: Teachers College Press.

Jordan, A. E., & Meara, N. M. (1990). Ethics and the professional practice of psychologists: The role of virtues and principals. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 21 (2), 107-114.

Kessels, J. P. A. M., and Korthagen, F. A. J. (1996). The relationship between theory and practice: Back to the classics. Educational Researcher, 25 (3), 17-22.

Kitchener, K. S., & King, P. M. (1981). Reflective judgment: Concepts of justification and their relationship to age and education. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 2, 89-116.

Korthagen, F. A. J. (1985). Reflective teaching and preservice teacher education in the Netherlands. Journal of Teacher Education, 36 (5), 11-15.

Korthagen, F. A. J. (1990, April). Techniques for stimulating reflection through seminars on campus. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Boston.

Korthagen, F. A. J. (1993). Two modes of reflection. Teacher and Teacher Education, 9 (3), 317-326.

LaBoskey, V. (1989). An exploration of the nature and stability of reflectivity in preservice teachers. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

Liston, D. P., & Zeichner, K. M. (1987). Reflective teacher education and moral deliberation. Journal of Teacher Education, 38, 2-8.

MacIntyre, A. (1966). After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Noddings, N (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Pojman, L. P. (1990). Ethics: Discovering right and wrong. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Inc.

Posner, G. J. (2000). Field experience: A guide to reflective teaching. New York: Longman.

Regan, T. G., Case, C. W., & Brubacher, J. W. (2000). Becoming a reflective educator: How to build a culture of inquiry in the schools. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Ross, E. W, & Hannay, L. M. (1986). Towards a critical theory of reflective inquiry. Journal of Teacher Education, 37 (4), 9-15.

Ross, D. D. (1989). First steps in developing a reflective approach. Journal of Teacher Education, 40 (2), 22-30.

Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner. New York: Basic Books.

Schön, D. A. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schön, D. A. (1992). The theory of inquiry: Dewey's legacy to education. Curriculum Inquiry, 22 (2), 119-139.

Sparks, L., & Mohlman, G. (1991, April). Promoting cognitive, critical, and narrative reflection. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago.

Taggart, G. L. & Wilson, A. P. (1998) Promoting reflective thinking in teachers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Valli, L. (1990). Moral approaches to reflective practice. In P. P. Grimmett & G. L. Erickson (Eds.), Reflection in teacher education (pp.39-55).

Valli, L. (1997). Listening to other voices: A description of teacher reflection in the United States. Peabody Journal of Education, 72 (1), 67-88.

Van Manen, M. (1977). Linking ways of knowing with ways of being practical. Curriculum Inquiry, 6 (3), 205-228.

Van Manen, M. (1991). The tact of teaching: The meaning of pedagogical thoughtfulness. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zeichner, K. M. (1994). Research on teacher thinking and different views of reflective practice in teaching and teacher education. In I. Carlgren, G. Handal, and S. Vaage (Eds.), Teachers' minds and actions: Research on teachers' thinking and practice (pp. 9-27). London: Falmer, 9-27.

Zeichner, K. M., & Liston D. P. (1985). Varieties of discourse in supervisory conferences. Teaching and Teacher Education, 1 (2), 155-174.

Zeichner, K. M. & Liston, D. P. (1987). Teaching student teachers to reflect. Harvard Educational Review, 57 (1), 23-48.